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Abstract
This paper presents secure network provenance (SNP), a novel technique for tracking down compromised
nodes in a distributed system and assessing the damage that they may have caused to other nodes. SNP
enables operators to ask the system why it is in a certain state – for example, why a suspicious routing
table entry is present on a certain router, or where a given cache entry originated. SNP is robust to
manipulation; its tamper-evident properties ensure that operators can detect when compromised nodes
lie or falsely implicate correct nodes. Thus, compromised nodes can at worst refuse to participate,
making their presence evident to operators. We describe an algorithm for answering SNP queries, as well
as a proof-of-concept implementation.
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to be lost. It would be more preferable if the operators
could determine the precise effects of the intrusion.
Recent work in the database community on data provenance [2] provides a promising new approach to answering these questions. In essence, data provenance tracks
and records dependencies between data items in a database.
A similar notion in the networking domain – network
provenance [20, 21] – describes the history and derivations of network state (maintained as declarative networks [11]) that results from the execution of a distributed
protocol. For example, a provenance system might record
that a routing table entry on router A was created in response to a route announcement from router B, which in
turn was triggered by the arrival of two other announcements from routers C and D, and so on. Conceptually,
provenance forms a global dependency graph, whose
nodes are the data items and whose edges represent message transmissions or processing steps.
Provenance graphs can easily be used to answer our
earlier questions about causes and effects. To determine
the causes of data item d, we start from d and follow the
edges in the reverse direction until we arrive at a set of
leaf nodes, such as local inputs, which have no further
dependencies. To determine the effects of d, we follow
the edges in the forward direction.
However, existing provenance techniques are designed
for a cooperative setting in which all parties behave honestly. They cannot be applied in a setting with untrusted
parties or compromised nodes because an adversary can
lie about provenance. For example, the adversary can
fabricate plausible provenance information for any state
introduced, or worse, he can make it appear as if the correct nodes were the source of a detected attack. Since
such malicious behavior may prevent or delay discovery
of the intrusion, an unsecured provenance system can actually slow down the forensic process.
This paper proposes an approach towards secure network provenance (SNP), a framework for utilizing provenance information in a potentially untrustworthy environment. SNP is an equivalent of data provenance in
an adversarial setting, answering questions about both
the causes and the effects of data items even in the presence of coalitions of Byzantine [9] nodes. Furthermore,
to achieve scalability, SNP does not make use of trusted

This paper presents secure network provenance (SNP), a
novel technique for tracking down compromised nodes
in a distributed system and assessing the damage that
they may have caused to other nodes. SNP enables operators to ask the system why it is in a certain state – for example, why a suspicious routing table entry is present on
a certain router, or where a given cache entry originated.
SNP is robust to manipulation; its tamper-evident properties ensure that operators can detect when compromised
nodes lie or falsely implicate correct nodes. Thus, compromised nodes can at worst refuse to participate, making their presence evident to operators. We describe an
algorithm for answering SNP queries, as well as a proofof-concept implementation.

1. INTRODUCTION
Operators of networks and distributed systems often find
themselves needing to answer a diagnostic or forensic
question. Some part of the system is found to be in an
unexpected state – for example, a suspicious routing table entry is discovered or a proxy cache is found to contain an unusually large number of advertisements – and
the administrator must determine the causes of this state
before he can decide on an appropriate response. On
the one hand, there may be an innocent explanation: the
routing table entry may be caused by a misconfiguration,
or the cache entries may simply be the result of a workload change. On the other hand, the unexpected state
may be the symptom of an ongoing attack: the routing
table entry may be the result of route hijacking, and the
cache entries may be a side-effect of a malware infection.
If the system is indeed under attack, the operators must
act quickly to prevent further damage.
Once an attack or intrusion is discovered, a different
challenge arises. Suppose the operators have discovered
that a certain set of nodes has been compromised. To repair the damage, it may be insufficient to disinfect these
specific nodes, since the damage may have already spread
to the rest of the system. For example, the adversary
may have already polluted a database, altered code, or installed a backdoor. Restoring a backup of the entire system would solve this problem, but such a solution is disruptive and might cause a considerable amount of work
1

• link(@X,Y,k) indicates that router X has a direct
link to router Y with cost k;
• cost(@X,Y,Z,k) indicates that X knows a path via
Y to Z with total cost k;
• bestCost(@X,Y,k) indicates that the cheapest path
known by X to Y has cost k.
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The location specifier @ denotes the node on which the
tuple resides. We say that the link tuples are base tuples because they are part of the static configuration of
the routers (we assume that routers have a priori knowledge of their local link costs), whereas the cost and
bestCost tuples are derived from other tuples according to one of three rules: each router knows the cost of
its direct links (R1); it can learn the cost of an advertised route from one of its neighbors that combines a
link tuple with its bestCost to the destination (R2)1 ;
and it chooses its own bestCost tuple according to the
lowest-cost path it currently knows (R3).
To illustrate network provenance, consider the provenance of tuple bestCost(@C,D,5). This tuple can be
derived in two different ways. Router C knows its direct
link to D via link(@C,D,5), which trivially produces
the tuple cost(@C,D,D,5). Similarly, router B derives cost(@B,D,D,3) via its direct link with D, and
since no other path from B to D offers a lower cost, B
produces the tuple bestCost(@B,D,3). B then combines the knowledge along with link(@B,C,2) to derive cost(@C,B,D,5) and communicates it to C. If
we follow each derivation all the way back to base tuples,
we obtain the provenance tree shown in Figure 2. This
tree concisely explains how the tuple at its root came into
existence.

D
Figure 1: Example network with five routers. Each
link is annotated with its cost, and each router is trying to find the best route to D.
third parties. This very conservative threat model allows
us to give strong assurances to operators while minimizing an adversary’s ability to evade or abuse the system.
Ideally, we would like to guarantee that provenance
queries return complete, accurate, and consistent
responses. However, this seems infeasible in the absence
of a trusted party because nodes can suppress information, lie about where their data came from or how they
processed it, destroy or corrupt any local state, or refuse
to engage in the protocol. In light of these challenges,
SNP provides a slightly weaker property in order to
achieve practicality. Specifically, our proposed SNP solution (i) operates only on observable data (i.e., data that
has directly or indirectly affected at least one correct
node); and (ii) may return incomplete responses. However, if a response is incomplete, SNP will eventually
identify at least one faulty or compromised node.
A key contribution of this paper is SNP’s provenance
graph, which enables the use of provenance in an adversarial setting and differs substantially from the graph
commonly used in the database community. For example, our provenance representation explicitly models time,
message transmissions, and the information that is locally available at each node. A fortuitous consequence
of this richer model is that we gain the ability to answer
very rich queries (e.g., about the causes of a state change,
or about consistent snapshots) that substantially generalizes the classical notion of data provenance. Supporting
such rich queries further enhances an operator’s ability
to fight intrusions and malicious behavior.

3. SECURE NETWORK PROVENANCE
Existing network provenance systems are typically engineered for honest environments in which no party misbehaves. Unfortunately, when an adversary does exist,
such provenance systems are easily manipulated. For example, malicious parties can destroy tuples, prevent the
system from stabilizing, equivocate by giving different
information to different nodes, and provide false provenance information. In this paper, we adopt a conservative threat model and assume that an unknown subset of
nodes is Byzantine and can behave arbitrarily.
SNP allows users to detect false or inaccurate provenance data through the use of tamper-evident logs [5] of
communicated messages which we call secure histories.
The details of our approach are described below, but at a
high level, SNP achieves secure network provenance by
augmenting the standard provenance tree as follows:

2. NETWORK PROVENANCE
Network provenance is applicable to a wide range of systems and protocols, but for ease of exposition we describe it in the context of a simple protocol, MinCost,
that computes the minimal path cost between all pairs
of nodes. We consider the network shown in Figure 1,
which consists of five routers that are connected by links
of different costs. Each router attempts to find the lowestcost path to the destination D. For now, we assume that
there is no malicious behavior.
At any given time, the state of a router X is represented
as a collection of tuples. In this simple example, we only
need three types of tuples:

• To support historical queries (that is, provenance of
past tuples), SNP annotates each tuple with a time interval during which it was valid.
1
We assume that links are symmetric, that is, the existence of
a link S → D implies the existence of a link D → S with the
same cost.
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Figure 2: Provenance of bestCost(@C,D,5) at Figure 3: Secure network provenance of bestCost(@C,D,4). Each tuple is
router C. The notation @X indicates that the tuple was annotated with a time interval (shown as italic) during which the tuple was derivderived at router X, and Rx means that derivation x able. Dashed lines indicate network transmissions; and belief tuples are underlined.
Shaded boxes highlight manipulations by the compromised router.
was used.
tR−
be their respective arrival times. Add a belief
i
R−
tuple τ¯i , annotate it with interval [tR+
i , ti ], and
create dependencies τi → τ¯i → τ ;
iv. Let tS+
and tS−
be the transmission times of m+
i
i
i
S+
and m−
and destroyed
i . If τi was created on Y at ti
on Y at tS−
and continuously derivable in between,
i
recursively determine the provenance of τi . Otherwise flag τi as incorrect.

• To indicate detected misbehavior, tuples that have been
derived incorrectly are flagged in the tree.
• To reason about transient states, whenever a tuple τ1
on a node A is partly derived from a tuple τ2 that existed on another node B during interval [t1 , t3 ], SNP
adds a belief tuple τ¯2 on A with validity interval [t2 , t4 ],
where t2 is the time A learned of τ2 ’s insertion, and t4
is the time A learned of τ2 ’s deletion. τ¯2 represents
A’s belief that τ2 exists on B; thus, τ1 depends on τ¯2 ,
which in turn depends on τ2 . Such an annotation provides a convenient way to represent lies and equivocation: in this case, the belief of one node is simply
different from the reality on another.

Reverse Provenance. The algorithm for reverse provenance (that is, determining the effects of a datum) is analogous; the main differences are that it considers outgoing
rather than incoming messages, and that it terminates at
currently extant tuples rather than at base tuples.

Below, we first outline how provenance trees may be annotated to support historical queries, and then discuss
SNP’s techniques for securing provenance data.

3.2 Secure Histories
The algorithm presented in Section 3.1 assumes the existence of an accurate, distributed record of all communicated messages. Unfortunately, reliably capturing all
traffic is infeasible in an adversarial setting without relying on a trusted third party.
SNP maintains secure histories by recording messages
in tamper-evident logs [5] that are stored at participating
nodes. Briefly, the logs involve signing and acknowledging all messages, as well as exchanging information
about each message with some other nodes to detect inconsistencies. A useful property of such tamper-evident
logs is that they can provably guarantee that either a
complete and accurate trace of all observable messages
is obtained, or the identity of at least one compromised
node will eventually be learned [5]. In either case, the
operators obtain useful information.
Once the identity of the compromised node is established, provenance information derived using SNP can
be used to understand the flow of attack, by tracing all
messages and network state that result from the compromised node.
There are two points to note here. First, the tamperevident logs are only guaranteed to contain all observable messages, i.e., all messages that directly or transitively affect at least one correct node. If two com-

3.1 Historical Network Provenance
Traditional provenance techniques provide explanations
as to a current network state. SNP adds the additional
capability to query historical network provenance, enabling a user to determine the causes of a prior state.
Suppose each node has a complete and accurate record
of all the messages it has sent or received. (We relax
this assumption in the following section.) Then SNP can
determine the provenance of a tuple τ that existed on a
node X at time t as follows:
1. Replay all the messages X has received up to time t,
and check whether τ can be derived from tuples that
existed at t. If so, annotate τ with I := [t1 , t2 ], the
largest interval with t ∈ I during which τ was continuously derivable. If not, flag τ as incorrect.
2. For each tuple τi from which τ was derivable during
I, do the following:
i. If τi is a base tuple, add a dependency τi → τ ;
ii. If τi is a local tuple on X, add a dependency τi → τ
and recursively determine the provenance of τi ;
iii. Otherwise, τi must be from another node Y. Let m+
i
be the message from Y that created τi , m−
i the message from Y that deleted τi (if any), and tR+
and
i
3

promised nodes secretly exchange messages but do not
otherwise change their behavior, the correct nodes may
never learn about this (but they also remain unaffected
by it). Second, if a compromised node equivocates, i.e.,
sends conflicting tuples to different correct nodes, a provenance query that involves one of the tuples may initially
appear correct (e.g., while the message with the second
tuple is still in transit). However, the tamper-evident logs
guarantee that the equivocation is eventually revealed.

fies our prototype since provenance is easy tracked in the
declarative model.
An NDlog program consists of a set of rules of the
form h :- p1,p2,. . .,pn, where h is a tuple and the pi
are predicates on other tuples. The rule stipulates that the
tuple h is derived when all the predicates pi are satisfied.
For example, the MinCost protocol from Section 2 can
be written as
r1 cost(@S,D,D,C) :- link(@S,D,C).
r2 cost(@Z,S,D,C1+C2) :- link(@S,Z,C1),
bestCost(@S,D,C2).
r3 bestCost(@S,Z,min<C>):-cost(@S,D,Z,C).

3.3 Example
To illustrate how our prototype works, we now describe
an example scenario. Suppose the adversary has compromised router E in the network depicted in Figure 1, and
he wants to snoop on traffic from router A. Neither of A’s
best routes traverses E, but the adversary can change this
by making it appear that the cost of link D–E has been
reduced to 1. He can do this in at least two ways: by
changing the local base tuple to link(@E,D,1) or by
lying to C about the cost of the advertised route to D.
Now suppose the operator of router C notices that the
cost of the route at C has changed to 4, and he runs a
provenance query on bestCost(@C,D,4). Figure 3
shows the resulting provenance trees, assuming that
router E is cooperating. If the adversary has changed
the base tuple, the operators can see the new tuple (left
tree); if E had earlier lied to C, the corresponding tuple is
flagged as incorrect (right tree). If router E had refused to
cooperate with the query or returned bogus information,
the tamper-evident log would have directly identified E
as faulty. In all cases, the malicious behavior is detected.

Implementation: Our prototype is based on existing
code from ExSPAN [21] for tracking provenance, on
RapidNet [13] for compiling NDlog programs, and on
PeerReview [5] for the tamper-evident log. In addition,
we implemented a new query engine that uses the algorithm from Section 3.1 to answer provenance queries using the tamper-evident log.
Experimental setup: Our experiments are performed
on simulated networks. We instantiate N logical nodes,
randomly insert links and link costs such that the average degree of each node is four, and connect the nodes
using a simple network simulator that passes each transmitted message directly to the destination. Our setup is
sufficient to measure two important overheads of SNP:
the log size and the communication cost.
We compare three implementations of the MinCost
routing protocol specified above: MC is a baseline implementation in RapidNet without provenance, MC-Prov is
an implementation in ExSPAN that provides provenance
in a cooperative setting (without histories), and MC-SNP
is our SNP prototype. At the start of each run, the nodes
only have the base tuples, and we run the system until no
more tuples can be derived.

3.4 Summary
SNP ensures that, if the actions of an adversary directly
or indirectly affect at least one tuple τ on a correct node,
then the operators can either 1) obtain a correct and complete provenance tree for τ , which is useful for diagnostics and forensics, or they can 2) eventually identify a
compromised node N, either because the provenance tree
contains a derivation on N that is marked as incorrect, or
because N is found to have tampered with its log.

4.2 Overhead
Figure 4 shows the average size of the logs kept on each
node as a function of the number of nodes. Although
SNP maintains a history of all sent or received messages,
the per-node log size is reasonable (e.g., 3.5 MB for a
network with 100 nodes) and scales linearly with the
number of nodes. Also, note that the logs contain only
forensic information, require no further processing, and
can be kept on an inexpensive hard disk until they are
needed to answer a query.
Figure 5 plots the average amount of data transmitted by a node during an execution. MC-Prov requires
more communication than MC because it tags each tuple with provenance information; SNP causes approximately twice as much communication as MC-Prov due
to its tamper-evident log, which requires each message to
be cryptographically signed and acknowledged. Figure 6
shows a CDF of the total (network-wide) communication
cost for answering a provenance query; the median cost
is around 15 MB.
Despite the fact that our proof-of-concept implementation of SNP is entirely unoptimized, its overhead may
already be practical for some applications. The capac-

4. PROOF OF CONCEPT
To show how SNP might be applied to real distributed
systems, we have built a proof-of-concept implementation of SNP, which we describe next. We note that our
prototype still has many limitations; for example, it is
unoptimized, and it is tied to one particular programming
model. Hence, our results are not meant as an evaluation
of SNP, but rather as evidence that the SNP approach is
feasible.

4.1 Prototype Implementation
Programming model: For our prototype, we assume
that the distributed system to which SNP is being applied
is written in Network Datalog (NDlog) [11], a declarative networking language. While SNP is not specific to
a particular programming language, this choice simpli4

2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
0

20

40
60
Number of Nodes

80

Figure 4:

100

Average log size (MB) for
provenance maintenance.

2.5

1

MC-SNP
MC-Prov
MC

2

0.8

1.5

CDF

MC-SNP

3

Average Per-Node Comm. Cost (MB)

Average Log Size (MB)

3.5

1
0.5

0.6
0.4
0.2

0

MC-SNP

0
0

20

40
60
Number of Nodes

Figure 5:

80

100

Average communication cost
(MB) for provenance maintenance.

ity of commodity hard drives is currently measured in
terabytes, so spending a few mega- or even gigabytes
on forensic information is not unreasonable. Answering
provenance queries requires substantial communication;
however, our initial implementation downloads the entire log for all relevant nodes, when a small portion of
the log may suffice. A few straightforward optimizations
(e.g., taking snapshots periodically [5], partitioning of independent tuples [4], batching multiple messages [4] to
reduce cryptographic overhead, and caching and maintaining provenance eagerly [21]) will likely reduce this
cost dramatically.
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cost (MB) for provenance querying.

Monitor [18] can diagnose symptoms that arise from a
problem with the distributed algorithm (such as a bug or
a race condition), while SNP can also diagnose symptoms that are caused by certain nodes not following the
algorithm, e.g., by making incorrect state transitions or
by fabricating messages.
Intrusion detection: Distributed intrusion detection
systems (IDS) such as BackTracker [8] can be used to
establish causal relationship among events at different
nodes, based on information gathered from communication and system logs. Given an IDS alert, this enables
one to detect the source or effects of an attack indicated
by the alert. These systems often assume that logs at
each node are trusted, an assumption that may not hold
true when nodes are compromised or span multiple administrative domains. SNP also enables a wider range of
queries beyond simply querying for causal relationships
among different hosts.
Accountability: Accountability systems like PeerReview [5] and NetReview [4] can detect when nodes in
a distributed system deviate from the algorithm they are
expected to run. However, unlike SNP, these systems
cannot detect or diagnose problems that result from interactions between multiple nodes (such as an instance of
Bad Gadget [3] in interdomain routing), or problems that
are related to inputs or unspecified aspects of the algorithm. Finally, accountability systems focus on detecting
faults, whereas SNP also offers support for assessing the
extent of, and recovering from, their effects.

4.3 Functionality Check
We implemented the attacks described in Section 3.3 and
ran the corresponding queries. As expected, our prototype returned the provenance trees shown in Figure 3,
which can be used by operators to track down the compromised routers.

5. RELATED WORK
Provenance: SNP builds on recent work on the ExSPAN
distributed provenance system [21], and in particular, its
use of distributed queries for efficiently maintaining and
querying provenance in a distributed setting. However,
ExSPAN was designed for a cooperative environment and
can return inaccurate provenance trees when compromised
nodes are present. Additionally, ExSPAN cannot reliably
answer provenance queries on tuples that are unstable or
have already disappeared. Sprov [6] implements secure
provenance for individual documents; however, it lacks
essential features that are required in a distributed system, e.g., a consistency check to ensure that nodes are
processing messages in a way that is consistent with their
current state. Pedigree [16] captures provenance at the
network layer in the form of per-packet tags that store a
history of all nodes and processes that manipulated the
packet. It assumes a trusted environment, and its setbased provenance is less expressive compared to SNP’s
graph-based dependency structure.
Distributed debugging: Our work differs from most
existing work on debugging distributed systems in that
we consider a broader class of potential problems. Systems such as Magpie [1], D3S [10], Pip [17], and P2

6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have proposed secure network provenance (SNP), a novel approach to tracking adversarial
behavior in distributed systems. SNP helps operators
with forensics and mitigation by answering questions
about the causes and the effects of specific system states.
One of the key contributions of SNP is a secure provenance model, that is made possible by adapting the concept of data provenance, which usually assumes a cooperative setting, to systems where an unknown subset of
the nodes is controlled by a Byzantine adversary. We
have proposed an algorithm for answering SNP queries,
5

and early results are reported from a proof-of-concept
implementation based on ExSPAN and PeerReview.
Although our initial results seem encouraging, there
are several challenges that must be addressed before SNP
can be deployed in a production environment. This includes adding optimizations to reduce overheads, as well
as some more fundamental challenges discussed below.
Other programming models: Our initial prototype
assumes that the distributed protocol is specified in a
declarative language. This representation is very convenient for tracking provenance, but it also prevents our
prototype from being used with legacy applications or
new applications written in traditional imperative languages. However, the SNP concept itself is general and
can be applied to other programming models. For example, if a legacy system exposes its relevant network state
and inter-node communication to our system, our techniques for constructing provenance and verifying logs
can still be applied. To validate legacy support via a concrete application, we plan to integrate SNP with opensource routing suites (e.g. Quagga [15]). By securely establishing dependency relationships between BGP advertisements, our system can track packets as they traverse
through the network, reason about suspicious routing table updates, and detect policy conflicts across ASes.
In the absence of explicit rules to capture data dependencies, additional mechanisms (such as taint analysis [14] or programmer annotations) could be used to correlate changes in the network state to incoming/outgoing
network messages.
Extensible query language: An important benefit of
using a database approach towards maintaining and querying network provenance is the potential to utilize declarative languages for customizing the specific provenance
of interest. Zhou et al. [20, 21] demonstrate such capabilities using NDlog as the query language, typically by
issuing queries asking “why” questions on how a particular network state is derived based on its origins.
We intend to further extend the types of queries supported in SNP by providing mechanisms for querying
provenance in the forward direction (in addition to the
traditional reverse direction), and to enable time-traveling
for querying the history of a particular network state (i.e.,
to retrieve a consistent provenance state at a particular
period of time, or to discover how state changed over
time). Time-traveling in databases have been extensively
explored in the past as temporal databases [19]. However, it is still an open challenge how provenance can
be stored and queried efficiently in traditional databases
with versioning capabilities, and we believe the same
challenges also apply to SNP.
Finally, given that provenance is essentially a graph,
the database community has recently proposed the use
of graph-based languages [7] for formulating queries and
transformations over provenance data. We plan to explore distributed variants of these graph query languages,

which we believe can be transformed into NDlog queries
for execution.
Confidentiality: In some instances, it may be appropriate to treat provenance data as confidential. This is
particularly important when SNP is applied to a multidomain setting, where each autonomous system may limit
the provenance information that can be seen by other
nodes further downstream. Provenance information can
be hidden (encrypted) based on roles, security levels or
customized requirements.
A naı̈ve implementation of provenance may result in
information leakage by exposing sensitive information
to the recipients of the tuples, some of which may be
unauthorized to access the leaked data. We conjecture
that one can utilize information hiding techniques [12] to
support fine-grained confidentiality controls, by partially
encrypting provenance in a key-based tree-structured architecture.
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